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Borrowed Servants and the
Theory of Enterprise Liability
A third party who hires the regular employee of another to perform
temporary services may sometimes be held liable for the torts of his
"borrowed servant." Unfortunately the courts have failed to elaborate
consistent criteria for determining when the temporary employer is
liable and when the general employer may be held as an independent
contractor.
The borrowed servant doctrine is most frequently invoked against
those who Tent machinery or equipment together with an operator.'
In a typical situation Tinkers, a building contractor constructing a
baseball stadium, needs a high-lift device to put in the towering center-
field bleachers. He arranges with Evers, owner of a crane rental com-
pany, for the services of a crane and operator. Evers dispatches the crane
and operator Chance, whom he instructs to take good care of the
machine and to follow Tinkers' orders. Employees of the building
contractor tell Chance where to operate and give him signals for raising,
lowering, and swinging the crane boom and line; he manipulates
the controls and observes the crane company's general safety rules. The
stadium rises rapidly until the day when Chance, daydreaming of the
pleasurable hours he will some day spend in these very bleachers, forgets
to wait for a signal-and deposits two tons of steel on the foot of a
bystanding spectator.
2
1. Trucks, cranes, motorcycles, buses, tractors, power hoists, steam shovels, steam-
rollers, bulldozers, roadgraders, backloaders, and dragline machines are frequent instru-
ments of damage and death in this field. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 1888 (1951). The
machinery rental cases are only one phase of the borrowed servant problem of course,
but probably the most important phase.
2. Injuries to the public, to property, to employees of independent contractors, to the
employees of the borrower, and to the allegedly borrowed emplo)yee all usually require the
same determination of whether a second master-servant relauon was established. The
tests and procedures for attacking the question are the same, though complicated some-
times by contract provisions, liability insurance coverage, and workmen's compensation
systems.
Injury to the general contractor's employee by the temporary employee's negligence is
an especially common and complex subject of orrowed servant litigation. The injured
employee usually collects workmen's compensation insurance from his usual employer,
the building contractor. However, he is barred by law from suit to recover actual damages
from him, though they may be far more than the insurance plan awards. The victim
and the compensation insurer usually have an action against negligent third parties to
the accident, nonetheless, so they may attempt to prove that the negligent temporary
employee was still in the service of the general employer (crane company here). 2 A.
LARSON, THE IAW. oF WoansmN's CohtPm'NsAzi0N §§ 65, 71 (1961). See note 42 infra.
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Assuming that the injured party can prove Chance's negligence and
his own lack of it, he will have the traditional tort remedy against the
unfortunate servant. The victim would naturally prefer to sue the
servant's employer, since Chance is probably judgment-proof. But who
is the employer in this case? Building contractor Tinkers will argue
that Chance is the servant of an independent contractor, while crane
company owner Evers will claim that Chance was at the time of the
accident the borrowed servant of Tinkers. Except in Pennsylvania, only
one employer may be held liable.3
Under prevailing law the crane operator is unlikely to be deemed a
borrowed servant. Ostensibly applying the tests of "control" and "whose
business," together with a presumption that the original employment
relation has not been superceded, most courts will assign liability to
the crane company as an independent contractor.4 This outcome is not
assured, however, and the tests are flexible enough to justify the oppo-
site result without embarrassment. This note will briefly survey the
conventional doctrines, then suggest a revision in accord with emerging
theories of enterprise liability.
I.
Both the borrowed servant and the independent contractor doctrines
are variations on respondeat superior, and their application is governed
by the same tests of the employment relationship. Under a classic for-
mulation of the most important test, "[he] who has the power to control
and direct the servants in the performance of their work"5 is master,
and assumes liability for their negligent acts. If this party is the general
employer, then he is an independent contractor; if it is the temporary
employer, then he has a borrowed servant.
But in almost all borrowed servant cases control seems to be split, and
3. This single liability rule is a surprising deviation from an established pattern in
the law of contractors and subcontractors. Generally when a general contractor is held
liable for torts of a subcontractor's employee, the subcontractor remains liable as wiell.
When a temporary employee is found to be a borrowed servant, his original master In
effect being held not to be an independent contractor, then the same reasoning might
apply to make either or both employers liable. This note will argue that there are reasons
for preferring recovery from one of the employers, and will describe a method by which that
recovery may be guaranteed by the other.
4. Thus the borrowed servant situation is one in which the independent contractor
doctrine remains very much alive. This is in contrast to its general decay and near
demolition by a growing list of exceptions, 2 RESTATEIENT (SEcoND) OF TomTs § 409,
comment b (1965). The exceptions might easily be applied to make the temporary em.
ployer liable for a rented machinery operator's tort, but the) are not.
5. Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 222 (1909).
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one may reasonably say that either or both parties have it.6 The control
test invariably calls for the employer with the right of control, rather
than actual control, to be held. Yet the following indicia of the right
of control will almost always be divided between the general and
temporary employers: power to hire and fire; power to determine
hours of work; power to fix wages; duty to pay social security and
workmen's compensation insurance premiums; power to train for the
job; power to establish operating procedures and safety rules; fact of
daily reporting for work at a particular place; power to replace or
penalize for misconduct; power to direct for what purpose work should
be performed, when it should be performed and the manner of perform-
ing it in the particular situation; likelihood of observing and adjusting
the operations; ownership of the instrumentality involved; provision
for maintenance and service; place of storing the instrumentality when
not in use.
Cardozo, in a commonly quoted passage, used burden of proof to
resolve doubts about control:
The rule now is that as long as the employee is furthering the busi-
ness of his general employer by the service rendered to another,
there will be no inference of a new relation unless command has
been surrendered, and no inference of its surrender from the mere
fact of its division .... 7
This formulation makes the temporary employer liable only upon proof
of a total transfer of the right of control. But a rental business would
almost never divest itself of all authority over its employees.8 The Car-
dozo statement, if taken literally, amounts to abandonment of the bor-
rowed servant doctrine.9 Most courts do apply the presumption that
6. See Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Sertant Problem, 38 'Iblcit. L.
Rxv. 1222, 1228-31 (1940).
7. Charles v. Barrett, 233 N.Y. 127, 129, 135 N.E. 199, 200 (1922).
8. But see Welborn v. Dahell Rigging Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 268, 5 Cal. Rptr. 195
(1960), where a billing order signed daily by the renter of a crane contained the terms:
It is distinctly understood and agreed that the sole function of Owner is to furnish
equipment and/or operators for the use of Customer and that such equipment and
operators shall be under the exclusive direction, supervision, and control of Customer
during performance of this Work Order.
Id. at 271-72, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 197. But this transparent facade 'was disregarded in holding
the general employer (Owner) liable; the court noted that the hiring, firing, training.
and operational procedures of crane operators remained in the hands of the general
employer. Such attention to facts rather than contract provisions is usual in borrowed
servant cases. Kirkwood v. Sikorski, 262 Minn. 434, 115 N.V.2d 32 (1962); Rumberger v.
Welsh, 131 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1942).
9. Wylie-Stewart fach. Co. v. Thomas, 192 Okla. 505, 507, 137 P.2d 556, 558 (1943)
(criticizing and rejecting explicitly the extreme requirement of control shift). Nonetheless
shift of all control still seems to be demanded by some courts, as in California, e.g., Dory
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the original master-servant relation continues, but they often soften
the harsh requirement for rebutting it; they continue to weigh and
balance the diverse indicia of control.10 Predictably, the balancing
process is unreasoned and unpredictable."
The purpose of the control test is no more settled than its applica-
tion. Judicial emphasis on the power of control, rather than the actual
exercise of control, opens the test to the criticisms made of control as
a basis for respondeat superior generally. In a nation of small shop-
keepers, with a tort theory dominated by fault, the master's control
over his tortious servant was a plausible channel for imputing the
servant's guilt to him. When the master actually commanded the wrong-
ful act or missed a clear opportunity to forbid or prevent it, his own
culpability was apparent. Even when the wrong of the servant was not
directly related to a prior wrong of the master, the feeling still pre-
vailed that the evil might never have come to pass had the master com-
manded his servant in some other way.
12
Today hardly anyone believes that the fault of the employee can be
imputed to his corporate master. Modem commentators have discarded
the blameworthiness justification for the control test in favor of a more
pragmatic emphasis on the potential for accident prevention.18 Placing
v. Lacey, 114 Cal. App. 2d 73, 249 P.2d 550 (1952), and cases collected in Comment,
Borrowed Servant Doctrine, 14 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 40, 44 n. 18 (1957). Cf. Cicjek V.
Crane Serv. Co., 351 F.2d 788, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (an "especially strong showing" re-
quired to prove operator a borrowed servant) and Younkers v. Ocean County, 130 N.J.L.
607, 33 A.2d 898 (1943), which asks whether the general employer would win in a
hypothetical conflict of authority over employee's conduct.
10. The problem is what degree of control short of absolute control is sufficient to
make the temporary employer liable. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECoND) or AcErCY § 227, comment a
(1957) states the common requirement that the relation at the time of the specific negli-
gent act from which injury results is determinative; but it also lists, id. at § 220 (2), ten
factors which are relevant to finding that relation, among them some so remote from
the specific act as length of time and method of payment in the employment. One
judicial approach is to throw all the operative facts about the temporary employment
into the hopper and determine the "degree or extent of severance and transfer [of
control] in the specific situation," McFarland v. Dixie Mach. & Equip. Co., 348 Mo, 341,
351, 153 S.W.2d 67, 71 (1941), while another is to concentrate on those facts with a close
practical relation to the specific act, McCollum v. Smith, 339 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
11. Compare, e.g., Nepstad v. Lambert, 235 Minn. 1, 50 N.W.2d 614 (1951), with
Welborn v. Dazell Rigging Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 268, 5 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1960). In these
representative cases a servant or foreman of the temporary employer gave signals for
specific movements of the crane to perform the task for which the machine was rented-
the negligence of the rented crane operator resulted in injury. In Nepstad the court held
such evidence of control sufficient to make the operator a servant of the borrower,
while in the Welborn case the giving of directions was regarded as inadequate evidence
of control. The legal effect of such signals inspired sharp majority.minority clashes in
Wylie-Stewart Mach. Co. v. Thomas, 192 Okla. 505, 137 P.2d 556 (1943), and McCollum
v. Smith, 339 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
12. See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTs § 26.3 (1956); Stevens, The Test of
the Employment Relation, 38 MicH. L. REV. 188, 198 (1939).
13. See generally Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE
L.J. 584, 720 (1929); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, TORTS § 26.3 at 1368 (1956).
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costs on those in control will encourage them and their insurance com-
panies to locate hidden dangers and upgrade safety procedures.' 4 But
this rationale, however sensible, does not explain the way courts use
the control test in borrowed servant cases. Courts do not, in fact, look
to see which employer could best have prevented the specific accident
in question; they openly disregard the real influence of the employers
in the job situation in favor of the abstract power over the employee
in his whole course of duty.'5 As applied, the control test makes little
sense either for the borrowed servant problem or for respondeat Mt-
perior.
In addition to the control test, courts often determine borrowed
servant questions by asking "whose business" is being done by the em-
ployee. 6 This test is even more ambiguous and sterile than the control
criterion. The phrasing of the question "whose business" implies that
only one employer is being served; yet for machinery rentals it is clear
that the servant operator is participating both in the business of equip-
ment renting and in the business for which the equipment is rented.
Clearly both enterprises require the operator's services in order to ac-
complish their tasks and to make their profits.' 7
14. See generally Douglas, supra note 13; 2 F. HAr, & F. JA s.r Torrs § 13.5 (1956).
But note the limitations on the validity of this accident prevention rationale: it too is
constructed on the partial fiction that employers can find dangers before they cause
injury, and it disregards that quota of accidents which is the inevitable cost of any activity,
regardless of safeguards. See Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an
Zndependent Contractor, 10 IND. L.J. 494, 498-99 (1935); A. EJRENZWEIG, NEGUGENc E WM-
OUT FAULT § 16 (1951).
15. E.g., Kelley v. Summers, 210 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1954) (control of dangerous crane
operation near exposed electric line held to be in absent general employer); Peters v.
United Studios, 98 Cal. App. 373, 277 P. 156 (1929) (driver of tractor under "control" of
general employer while performing under borrower's directions on studio set); Standard
Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909) (winch operator borrowed and directed by
stevedore company still under control of ship owner). But see McCollum v. Smith, 339
F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
The borrowed servant cases often stretch the control test so far that it becomes mean-
ingless; in some fields of respondeat superior, moreover, control as a working criterion
has been discarded altogether. Smith, supra note 6, at 1231-33.
16. The "whose business" terminology was introduced in the earlier cases as a
generalization to be proved by evidence of control
To determine whether a given case falls within the one class or the other we must
inquire whose is the work being performed, a question which is usually answvered
by ascertaining who has the power to control and direct the servants in the per-
formance of their work.
Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. at 221-22.
The concept was similarly described in the text accompanying note 5 supra. The emer-
gence of "whose business" as a separate test may be seen as an end run around the insur-
mountable control requirement set forth in Charles v. Barrett, 233 N.Y. 127, 135 N.E 199
(1922). See Smith, supra note 6, at 1233-44. The test seems to have declined in popularity
since Smith noted an increased emphasis on it.
17. In the realization that "often the elements that normally call for respondeat
superior liability are so divided that either one of the employers might justifiably be held,"
Haw v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 180 F.2d 18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1950), the courts of Pennsyl-
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A third possible test, rarely adopted by the courts, is the "scope of
the borrower's business" test. This approach, suggested by Talbot
Smith in 1940,'s would extend the liability of the borrower only to
activities within his normal sphere of operations, or within the usual
range of operation of similar enterprises. If the activity or skill of the
temporary servant is not part of the normal range of the borrower's
business, then the general employer is held.19 Normal range of business
includes those parts of the operation for which the borrower himself
maintains staff, facilities, and equipment..2 0 A building contractor who
owns and operates no cranes himself would not be held liable for the
negligence of a rented crane's rented operator. A law firm would not
be held for the torts of a plumber called in to fix the water fountain.
Yet a major trucking firm would answer for torts of the driver of an
extra truck rented during a period of heavy demand.
Smith inadequately explained the theoretical justification for his
test. His starting point, he claims, is
... the undoubted conviction of our people at the present time
... that a business must pay the reasonable cost of its passage. For
acts within the fair scope of the business, its liability should be
fixed.21
But since he failed to specify the goals served by enterprise liability,
courts have usually missed the point of his test.22 They have dismissed
vania have permitted juries to hold both employees liable when joined as defendants,
Kissell v. Motor Age Transit Lines, 357 Pa. 204, 53 A.2d 593 (1947); Sildekum v. Animal
Rescue League, 353 Pa. 408, 45 A.2d 59 (1946); Grasberger v. Liebert & Obert, Inc., 835
Pa. 491, 6 A.2d 925 (1939). This is termed a "sensible result" in 2 F. HARER & F. JAMES,
ToxTs § 26.11n.14 (1956), because it better reflects the ambivalence of authority and of
benefit which exists in most cases. It also assures compensation should one party be
judgment-proof; but there are strong reasons for rejecting the solution. See note 43
infra and accompanying text.
18. Smith, supra note 6, at 1248-54.
19. Id. at 1248-49.
20. Id. at 1249-50.
21. Id. at 1248.
22. See, e.g., McFarland v. Dixie Mach. & Equip. Co., 348 Mo. 341, 153 S.W.2d 67 (1941),
concerning a bulldozer rented from defendant machinery company by the WPA for use
in clearing land. During the operations the machine swerved suddenly, probably through
the negligence of the rented operator, injuring a WPA man who was riding the apparatus.
The court, attempting to apply Smith's test among others, found that operating the
bulldozer for clearing and pulling was within the scope of the WPA's business, anti that
the machine company was not liable. This result is surely incorrect under Smith's test.
Although there was clearing work to be done on the WPA job, the WPA did not itself
maintain a force of bulldozers and drivers for the task. The scale of the temporary
employer's own equipment ownership and organization are more important for "scope
of the business" than the requirements of a specific task; otherwise the temporary
employer would always bear liability. See Smith, supra note 6, at 1249-50. But see White
v. Bye, 342 Mich. 654, 663, 70 N.V.2d 780, 784 (1955), in which the court applied the
"scope of the business" test correctly. Crane and operator rented by building contractor
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it as no less confusing than the others,2 and reduced it to one of several
factors to be considered "in determining the degree of severance and
transfer" of the original employment relationship.24 Instead courts
hark back to the control and "whose business" tests for determina-
tion--or rationalization-of borrowed servant cases.
But if Smith's basic premise that a business must pay the reasonable
cost of its passage were more fully elaborated, a better approach to the
borrowed servant problem could be developed. The goal of this dis-
cussion will be to explain why, after all, it makes any difference which
employer is held; for if the only point is to pay a victim's hospital bill,
a simple rule of joint liability would suffice.25
II.
As an alternative to the much criticized fault system, many com-
mentators have suggested a system of "enterprise liability" under which
producers and manufacturers pay for all accidents associated with their
products regardless of fault.26 Enterprise liability, in their theory, is not
at all a scheme for raiding deep pockets. Indeed, it counts on the manu-
facturer's passing on the cost of accidents to the consuming public. By
this mechanism, the price of each product will be made to reflect the
cost of accidents entailed in its production. Enterprise liability works in
service of a rational allocation of resources and meaningful expression
of consumer preferences.27
Accidents and injuries are part of the costs of any activity, and may
were then borrowed by boiler installing crew. Negligence of the operator injured a
construction employee, and the crane rental company sought to prove its operator to
be the borrowed servant of the building contractor or the boiler installer. The court con-
cluded that the boiler installer used cranes only occsionally and maintained none of
his own; thus crane operation was not within the scope of his business. The test was not
applied to the building contractor, but it would have produced the same result-ap-
parently the needs of this sort of construction did not justify maintenance of his own
crane fleet by the building contractor.
23. Comment, Borrowed Servant Doctrine, 14 WAsm & LEE L. REv. 40, 47 (1957);
F. ACHEM, OuraNsrs OF AGENCY § 465 (4th ed. 1952). Mechem demonstrates no grasp at
all of the economic basis of the proposed test. See text accompanying notes 39-40 infra.
24. McFarland v. Dixie Mach. & Equip. Co., 348 Mo. at 351, 153 S.W.2d at 71. The
McFarland court considered "scope of the business" to be incorporated into 1 Rasr^TA-
AENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(h): "whether or not the work is a part of the regular
business of the employer."
25. Note 17 supra and text accompanying note 43 infra.
26. Douglas, supra note 13; A. EtmtErzxio, supra note 14; Calabresi, Some Thoughts
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Calabresi, Risk Distribution]; Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to
Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HALv. L. Rav. 713 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Calabresi,
Decision for Accidents].
27. Calabresi, Risk Distribution 501-02.
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be predicted over the long term with a certain statistical inevitability.
The costs of these injuries to society can to some extent be quantified
-even the costs of pain or loss of life are often roughly estimated, and
expressed in jury awards and death benefits. These accident costs, like
the more commonly considered costs of production, must be reflected
in the market price of the products which engender them if the con-
sumer is to be able to make meaningful market decisions. For if some
of the products vying for his attention do not reflect the costs required
to produce them, then the consumer's buying choices will be distorted,
the wrong activities will be encouraged, and a misallocation of re-
sources will result.
28
This resource allocation theory of enterprise liability has been aptly
termed "general deterrence." 20 Once the prices of products reflect their
accident costs, consumers will seek safer (now cheaper) substitutes and
manufacturers will seek safer means of production.
While promoting economic efficiency, enterprise liability also
"spreads" the costs of accidents among the many final consumers. This
spreading effect is desirable because small regular losses to consumers
cause less economic and social dislocation than does a catastrophic loss
to the accident victim.
30
Enterprise analysis suggests that businesses should be held liable re-
gardless of fault.31 But even if the requirement of a faulty employee is
retained, the insights of this theory are useful in solving borrowed ser-
vant problems. In borrowed servant cases the question is which of two
employers, neither of whom is negligent in the traditional sense, is to
be held. As to this question the same answers are indicated whether
or not we insist that liability is triggered only by negligent employee
conduct.
28. Calabresi, Decision for Accidents 716-25; Calabresi, Risk Distribution 500.07. The
derogation of the individual expression of preference by such distorted pricing is felt to
be incompatible with one of the "fundamental ethical postulates" of our society, that
"by and large people know what is best for themselves." Id. at 502. See also Calabres,
Fault, Accidents, and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216 (1965),
29. Calabresi, Decision for Accidents 742-45.
30. Calabresi, Risk Distribution 517-18. The economic dislocations include the elimina-
tion of useful factors of production (individuals and small businesses) which might
otherwise continue to contribute to the wealth of society. Thus, even spreading of losses
serves to some extent a cost-reduction function. Only limited spreading among persons Is
obtained in enterprise liability, however. If spreading were the only goal, then general
social insurance covering all accidents in all activities (and even non-accident losses such
as disease) would be in order. Id. at 502-03.
31. See note 26 supra. The mechanism for allocation of costs in an enterprise system
is nonetheless a complex one, because of the frequent conjunction of several businesses
or activities in accidents. Professor Calabresi has described an "involvement" approach
for distributing costs among possible loss bearers. Calabresi, Decision for Accidents 721-45.
One aspect of that approach is being applied in this discussion.
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Before applying enterprise liability theory directly to the borrowed
servant problem, it is useful to show how the theory affirms the con-
ventional doctrine of respondeat superior and places liability on one
of the two employers rather than the employee.3 - The employer is held
liable, first, because he will doubtless be better able to spread the costs
of the accident. Second, placing the liability on him will better serve
the general deterrence function. This latter conclusion, however, has
been challenged and requires some explanation.
Commentators have argued that, from the standpoint of resource
allocation, accident costs could as well be placed on employees as on
their employers.3 3 Because the employer and employee stand in a bar-
gaining relationship, the argument goes, the terms of employment will
reflect the parties' predictions of their liabilities. If indemnification
clauses are permitted the party that is not initially held liable can, for
a price, opt into liability. Even if indemnification clauses are disal-
lowed, however, the results will be essentially the same. If employees
are burdened with accident costs they will demand higher wages, pre-
sumably to buy liability and accident insurance. These higher wages
will force the employer to charge a higher price for his product, exactly
as if the employer himself had been made liable for accident costs.
But several practical reasons dictate that costs be placed on the em-
ployer.34 First, the crane driver is likely to underestimate the chances
of being personally involved in an accident and may not demand the
higher wages needed to cover his costs.3 Consequently the full cost of
accidents will not be shifted back to the employer. But unless this full
cost eventually has some impact on market decisions about cranes,
efficient allocation of resources will be thwarted. The employer is more
likely to appraise realistically the likelihood of accidents involving his
workmen, and can raise his price accordingly. Second, it is generally
cheaper for the employer to take out a single insurance policy than for
all his workers and potential victims to insure. Thus the resource alloca-
tion rationale of enterprise liability, as well as the goal of compensa-
32. See generally Calabresi, Risk Distribution 543-45; 2 F. I-uwER & F. JA.AES, ToM
§§ 26.5, 26.7 (1956).
33. The idea that actual or potential bargaining parties will alwa)s reach the same
final allocation of costs regardless of the initial placement of liability has been given its
most cogent theoretical elaboration in Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L w
EcoN. 1 (1960). See also Calabresi, Decision for Accidents 725-26.
34. Calabresi, Decision for Accidents 726-29.
35. Even if the employee did not underestimate, he might lack market power to
bargain effectively. The rise of strong unions weakens both the lack of knowledge and
lack of power arguments. Calabresi, Risk Distribution 506 n.25.
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tion, would require that accident costs be placed on the employer rather
than the employee.
Under either the fault doctrine of respondeat superior or under a
system of enterprise liability, the question now becomes whether to
hold liable the crane company or the building contractor. From the
standpoint of cost spreading we will usually be indifferent, since in
most instances both potential loss bearers will be going businesses capa-
ble of spreading their losses.36 The goal of general deterrence, however,
indicates on which employer accident costs should be placed.
It is true once again that the crane company and the building con-
tractor are in a bargaining relationship, so that in theory the initial
allocation of the loss is immaterial. If the crane company were charged,
then it would demand higher rental rates to cover the cost of insurance
and, at the same time, would be under pressure to reduce accident costs
lest the building contractor turn to safer crane companies. The cost
of crane accidents would be passed on by the crane company to the
builder, and by the builder to the final consumer. Similarly, if the
builder had to pay for crane accident costs, he would search for less
accident-prone substitutes and thereby apply pressure on the crane
company to reduce accidents. The accident costs of cranes or their
substitutes would be reflected in the builder's insurance rates. Alter-
natively, the parties could use indemnification clauses to decide who
would finally bear accident costs, regardless of whom the courts held
initially liable. In any event, the accident costs of crane use would be
reflected in the price of the builder's end product.
But as in the case of employer and employee, practical problems
upset this theoretical equilibrium. Businesses differ in their ability to
evaluate particular risks37 and to reflect risk evaluation in pricing;88
hence one or the other party may be the more efficient risk-bearer.
The average administrative costs of procuring insurance will prob.
36. The extent to which accident losses are shifted forward to consumers, backward
to production factors, or absorbed by the enterprises themselves, depends on such factors
as the nature of their competitive situation and the availability of less accident-prone
substitutes. Id. at 517-20.
37. Quite probably the risk evaluation will in fact be done by insurance companies
rather than the businesses themselves. Although insurance companies may be more methodi.
cal in their evaluation, they will presumably work from the same accident histories that the
businesses would use were they self-insuring. In this discussion it has been assumed for
the purpose of clarity that the businessmen themselves are doing the evaluating.
38. Should one of the businesses be in a monopoly position and be maximizing profit
at the current price, then it will continue to charge that monopoly price regardless of
increasing accident costs. To further increase prices would reduce the firm's profits. In
cases where its pricing decisions would not be affected, placing the cost on the monopoly
would not serve the resource allocation function. Calabresi, Risk Distribution 507-14.
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ably be the same for crane companies and building contractors. A
crane company, however, generally has a better statistical background
for estimating the likelihood of crane accidents, and thus can make
more accurate insurance and pricing decisions. In contrast the build-
ing contractor will probably lump all the potential accident costs of
his project together and use a broad insurance policy. He is unlikely
to isolate the costs of accidents involving cranes, for the purpose either
of demanding safer practices from the crane company or of considering
safer and cheaper substitutes29 There will be, in other words, too little
pressure on the contractor for reduction of crane accident costs, or on
the crane company for safer operation. Finally, even if the builder at-
tempted to evaluate crane accident costs, the task would be more ex-
pensive for him than for the crane owner. Thus general deterrence is
achieved more cheaply by imposing accident costs directly on the crane
owner.
In some cases, however, the building contractor may be a better
predictor of accidents-for example, if he rents a machine and operator
to perform the same services that a whole fleet of his own machines
and employees perform regularly. The contractor in this situation may
well have made a close evaluation of the accident costs associated with
the equipment. Moreover, his estimate should more closely reflect the
accident costs of the equipment in the particular use he contemplates.
Whether the use is extraordinarily risky or especially safe, his experi-
ence should enable him to make even more accurate pricing and insur-
ance decisions than the general employer. Thus he should be held
liable. The same result would be dictated by Smith's "scope of the bor-
rower's business" test; general deterrence serves simply to explain his
result.
There is another condition which may reduce the crane company's
advantage in predicting accidents. If the builder's demands on the use
of the crane are unusually severe, the crane company's ability to pre-
dict may be impaired. If, for instance, the building materials to be
lifted are extra-fragile, the statistical record of crane accidents, based
on more nearly average conditions, will not accurately reflect probable
accident costs on this particular project. If the temporary employer has
engaged in this particular dangerous crane operation more frequently
than the crane company, the relative abilities to predict may shift. Per-
haps on this account the builder should be held liable, since lie could
39. The liability insurer may well be unwilling to issue separate policies to the con-
tractor for crane operation or other categories of his enterprise.
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price on the basis of more accurate estimates. But the resulting uncer-
tainty would sacrifice the advantages of our rule of general employer
liability. If the parties themselves recognize the special predictive ca-
pacity of the temporary employer, they can shift the risk to him through
an indemnification agreement.
There may be cases, however, in which our building contractor uses
the crane for some particularly exotic and dangerous purpose which he
did not disclose to the crane company beforehand. The crane owner
might then have insufficient or inappropriate insurance coverage. Per-
haps he would not have agreed to rent his machine for such a job at
all had he known of the risk. Certainly he had no informed opportunity
to demand an indemnification agreement. It is likely, then, that the
initial failure to disclose the danger will result in underpricing and
underinsuring throughout the operation.
In these circumstances the law of contracts protects the crane com-
pany and ensures that the builder will be held liable. An undisclosed
extrahazardous use would not be within the reasonable contemplation
of the parties.40 Similarly, any agreement of the crane company to in-
demnify the building contractor would not be applied to damages re-
sulting from such undisclosed use. Thus in order to avoid liability the
builder must fully inform the crane company of the nature of the
expected operation.41
Thus, with these two exceptions, general deterrence theory calls for
placing accident costs on the general employer. This rule, however, has
certain dangers. If the crane companies, truck owners, and other gen-
eral employers are small, marginal businesses, they may be willing to
gamble against accidents by failing to insure. If accidents do occur,
they will be unable to pay heavy judgments, and will dissolve in bank-
ruptcy. The very ease of dissolution may lead these marginal general
employers to offer lower prices, which ignore their potential accident
costs. If this happens, two harmful results will follow. First, the whole
cost of accidents will fall on the victims, defeating the compensation
goal of accident law. Second, economic efficiency will suffer since the
40. See generally 1 & 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 107, 538 (2d ed. 1963). Several courts
have been influenced by unanticipated risk in the operation of rented machinery in
holding the temporary employer liable for resulting accidents. E.g., B & G Crane Serv.,
Inc. v. Thomas W. Hooley & Sons, 227 La. 677, 80 So. 2d 369 (1955) (twelve ton blocks
raised by crane rigged for eight ton blocks) and Famous Players Lasky Corp. v. Intlustrial
Accident Comm'n, 194 Cal. 134, 228 P. 5 (1924) (rented plane and pilot crashed wile
flying as directed at hazardous low altitude).
41. The parties cannot be absolutely certain when contracting that adequate disclosure
has been made. But the response to this sort of uncertainty will probably be greater efforts
toward good faith negotiation rather than expensive hedging of prices and insurance.
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price of the final product will understate the accident cost of its pro-
duction.4
An obvious way to guarantee compensation to victims in such cir-
cumstances is joint and several liability for general and temporary
employers.43 Were this allowed, the victim could sue the more solvent
employer, or join both employers as defendants with the option of
collecting from either.44 Such a course would not only avoid the prob-
lem of the judgment-proof employer, but would also eliminate the
need for judicial determination of the better risk evaluator. The joint
and several liability solution, however, threatens seriously to distort
the allocation of resources. The employers can only guess whom the
victim will choose to sue. The parties will be forced to bargain in a
context of substantial uncertainty-each party will have to estimate,
first, the risk of accidents, and second, how often the victim will collect
from him rather than the other employer. The poorer as well as the
better risk evaluator will have to make the first estimate, while neither
party will be competent to make the second. Thus the two parties to-
gether may grossly over- or under-insure. The parties might attempt
to reduce the cost of uncertainty through indemnification agreements;
but if each party feels that the other is more likely to be sued no agree-
ment will be reached.45
If state law allowed contribution between the liable parties, then
42. At this point it is necessary to point out an anomaly in the argument thus far
presented. If, as in note 2 supra, the victim is an employee of the building contractor, a
serious problem is posed for the general deterrence rationale. Full compensation and full
reflection of costs in prices can never result if the negligent operator is held to be a
borrowed servant instead of the employee of a third party (the crane company). Should
the crane company always be held in such circumstances, in order to improve compensa-
tion and resource allocation?
Arguably not; meager but certain recovery under workmen's compensation laws is a
dear declaration of public policy, a conscious interference with the workings of free
market and open court in the name of administrative effidency and employee welfare.
To allow the additional recovery against the general employer of the negligent temporary
servant in all cases would be to thwart the workmen's compensation scheme. The addi-
tional recovery should be allowed only where recovery against third parties is allowed
and where the general employer is an independent contractor under the criteria discussed
above.
43. See note 17 supra.
44. A victim could also, of course, collect part of the judgment from both parties held
jointly and severally liable. Such a pattern of liability with regard to the victim, however,
does not necessarily determine the ultimate obligations of the two employers between
themselves; there might be a primary liability based on the usual control test. But in
Pennsylvania joint and several liability with regard to the victim seems in the first
instance to be allowed only on a finding that control is split or joint. Siidekum v. Animal
Rescue League, 357 Pa. 204, 53 A.2d 593 (1947). Where control is found to be in one
employer, the conventional single recovery is allowed. Funk v. Hawthorne, 138 F.2d 6S6
(3d Cir. 1943). Therefore, when joint and several liability is applied, the employer may
expect to share the ultimate burden equally through contribution (in the absence of a
prior indemnity agreement).
45. See also note 52 and p. 821 infra.
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an ultimate burden of half the accident cost could be anticipated by
each employer.46 But this added certainty does not eliminate the re-
source allocation distortion. First, contribution means that two suits
may be needed. Second, the poorer risk evaluator is required to bear
half the loss.
A better solution, accomplishing both compensation and general
deterrence, would first grant the victim recovery against the party bet-
ter able to evaluate the risk of accidents. Only if that party were judg-
ment-proof would recovery be allowed against the other employer.
4
This system of priorities of liability would depend, of course, on the
ability of the victim to join both employers in the same action, seeking
alternative remedies; 48 efficiency would be sacrificed if two trials were
a frequent necessity. Priority liability, like joint and several liability,
would discourage temporary employers from dealing with fly-by-night
rental companies whose unconcern for law suits allowed them to offer
rental prices which did not reflect accident costs.
A priority of liabilities system will ensure considerable certainty for
the parties. But because the rule of initial liability for the general em-
ployer does not apply when similar machine operation is within the
"scope of the borrower's business," the parties may fear that their pre-
diction of liability will be upset in court. Uncertainty will be no more
severe than under current law, but it will nonetheless result in some
double insurance, added costs of investigation, and superfluous litiga-
tion. These problems can be mitigated by the parties themselves
through indemnification agreements.
Wherever indemnification is allowed, the party who estimates the
accident cost to be lower will wish to indemnify the other in order to
get a better price for himself.49 Suppose, for instance, that a crane is
rented to be used in an especially dangerous situation, more familiar
to the builder than to the crane company. The crane company may
feel so insecure as to require $70 worth of insurance, while the more
46. Under most contribution statutes the damages are shared equally by the tort-
feasors. 1 F. HARPER &- F. JAMES, TORTS § 10.2 (1956).
47. The relation is thus in effect that of principal to guarantor, rather than that of
principal to technical surety.
48. Such joinder for relief in the alternative is available under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)
and derivative state rules; it might be impossible under some of the older state codes. See
3 J. MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE § 20.04 (2d ed. 1963). Should the plaintiff victim sue only
one employer, that defendant could usually be relied upon to join the other as co-
defendant.
49. A "better price" for the general employer would be a rental charge reduced by
less than the anticipated accident costs; for the temporary employer a better price would
be a rental price reduced by more than the accident costs he anticipates.
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knowledgeable building contractor would need to spend only $50. The
parties should have little trouble agreeing to place the accident risk
on the builder, with the crane rental reduced accordingly.
Appellate case reports suggest that parties who rent and parties who
operate often make informal oral contracts with no particular consid-
eration of the details of accident liability.", Thus, indemnification seems
likely only where significant prediction disparities make it worthwhile
for the parties to pause, reason together, and redistribute the insurance
burden.5 1 In such cases, the considered judgments reflected in indem-
nification agreements may improve resource allocation. 2
The suggested approach, then, usually holds the general employer
primarily liable, with recovery against the temporary employer if the
general employer cannot pay. The priority of liabilities is reversed
when the "scope of the borrower's business" exception applies, or when
the injury arises from activities outside the scope of the contract. The
parties may redistribute losses if they explicitly agree to do so, subject
to the requirement of disclosure. This system would seem to achieve
maximum general deterrence and adequate spreading, with minimal
administrative costs.
50. E.g., Parlow v. Dan Hamm Drayage Co., 391 S.W.2d 315 0to. Sup. Ct. 1955):
Alabama Power Co. v. Smith, 273 Ala. 509, 142 So. 2d 228 (1962). Indemnity contracts
are strictly construed against the indemnitee claimant, and must be extremely precise
and unequivocal before courts will recognize them. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.
v. Paulk, 180 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1950).
51. Indemnification should not be allowed, however, for accidents attributable to
undisclosed risks. See text at p. 818 supra. There may also be situations where indemni-
fication should be disallowed because one party has used superior bargaining power to
force a poor risk evaluator to agree to indemnify him. Often this situation may be
viewed as just a variation on failure to disclose, since poor bargaining position is often
accompanied by ignorance of dangers.
52. Because indemnification can alter any initial allocation of loss, there is some
danger to general deterrence from its misuse. When under the pressure of competition or
from ignorance a party undervalues the probable cost of accidents, he will attempt to
assume liability in return for a better price. The crane company, for example, may
reveal that $70 of its rental price is for insurance at the normal level. The building con-
tractor, although he has little basis for prediction, may balk at this figure and think that
less insurance-say $50 worth-would be adequate. The crane company will usually be
willing to reduce its price $70 in return for indemnification by the building contractor,
who will take out only $50 of insurance. When this pattern occurs, and the true
accident costs approach the better prediction of $70, a misallocation will result; the
true cost will not be reflected in price of the end product. A party who undervalues
and is burned by a large judgment will either learn to make more accurate evaluations
or stop indemnifying. In any event, perhaps a party aware of his incapacity for prediction
would not accept liability unless he could charge enough to overinsure, to be on the safe
side. Thus the degree of misallocation due to indemnification will be limited.
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